In numerous asbestos cases, independent suppliers have been named as defendants under multiple theories. In the early to middle 1900’s, suppliers were only liable for their own negligence. In the 1970’s, Ohio joined the trend across the country and held that suppliers could be liable under a strict liability theory. For several years, defendants have argued that Ohio’s adoption of strict liability was prospective only, limiting the liability of suppliers in cases alleging exposure as far back as the 1920’s and 1930’s. The Ohio Supreme Court recently agreed with defendants’ position.

Ohio did not adopt strict liability for suppliers until 1977, when the Court decided Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1997) 50 Ohio St. 2d 317. Many defendant suppliers had argued to the various courts that the decision of Temple should be applied prospectively only. In the case of DiCenzo v. A-Best Products Company, Inc., the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas agreed with the defendant’s arguments and granted summary judgment for a supplier on the strict liability claims. Plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s holdings. The Ohio Supreme Court was then asked to decide the issue.

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of the suppliers, holding that the decision in Temple was prospective only. In so ruling, the Court adopted the three-part test in Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, (1971), 404 U.S. 97, as the standard for analyzing whether a decision is prospective or retroactive, despite a U.S. Supreme Court’s later decision overruling Chevron Oil’s test.

Chevron Oil required the Court to evaluate three questions: 1) does the decision establish a new principal of law that was not clearly foreshadowed; 2) does retroactive application of the decision promote or hinder the purpose behind the decision; and 3) does retroactive application of the decision cause an inequitable result.

As to the first question, the Court held that Temple decided an issue of first impression, whether a non-manufacturer supplier could be strictly liable. The Court concluded that the decision in Temple was not foreshadowed by any prior decision, and therefore suppliers had no reason to believe that they could be strictly liable.

As to the second question, the Court determined that its decision today neither hinders nor promotes the purpose behind the product liability law. The Court found that a primary purpose to the strict liability doctrine is to induce manufacturers and suppliers to do everything possible to reduce the risk of injury and insure against what risks remain. In this case, since asbestos has not been used for approximately 30 years, neither manufacturers nor suppliers could take any steps to make the products safer.

As to the third question, the Court found that it would be inequitable to impose the rule of law in Temple on non-manufacturing suppliers of asbestos products prior to its decision. The Court found that it would be inequitable for suppliers, who at the time were liable only for their own negligence, could be liable decades later for injuries to users of the products. Applying Temple retroactively would impose a potential financial burden on suppliers for an obligation that was not foreseeable at the time of the sale.

As a result, the Court concluded that the Temple decision was prospective only. As a result, suppliers, who did not modify, rename or repackage products that contained asbestos are not strictly liable in tort for injuries prior to 1977.

The net effect of this decision remains to be seen. In cases where an asbestos plaintiff had his or her last exposure prior to 1977 will not be able to pursue a strict liability claim against a supplier. However, most cases involved long exposures, often beginning prior to 1977 and concluding many years later. In cases where Ohio’s apportionment statute applies, the supplier, while facing some liability, will likely have a smaller percentage as a result of the limited time frame under which they could be found liable.

If you have any additional questions, please contact us at your convenience.

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